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POSTEMIPLOYMENT RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS: CLIENT
BASE PROTECTION IN WASHINGTON-Perry v. Moran, 109
Wash. 2d 691, 748 P.2d 224 (1987), modified, 111 Wash. 2d 885, 766
P.2d 1096, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989).
Abstracl Most jurisdictions enforce postemployment noncompetition covenants that
reasonably prevent an employee from using his or her relationship with the employer's
clients to take the clients. In Perry v. Moran, the Washington Supreme Court enforced an
employment agreement that prevented the employee from taking her employer's clients,
regardless of whether she had personal contact with each of the clients or whether the
clients had left the employer's services for reasons other than to follow the employee. This
note concludes that a postemployment noncompetition covenant is not reasonable if it
prevents an employee from serving an employer's clients with whom the employee had no
significant personal contact or clients who left the employer's services for reasons other
than to follow the employee.
May a postemployment restrictive covenant reasonably prevent a
professional from serving any client who had been the employer's cli-
ent during the professional's term of employment? In Perry v. Moran, I
the Washington Supreme Court enforced a postemployment restrictive
covenant that prevented an accountant from serving any of her former
employer's clients.2 The accountant had worked as head of one of the
firm's three departments.3 After slightly more than one year the
accountant left the firm and accepted business from several of the
firm's clients.4 The court held that the postemployment restrictive
covenant was reasonable.5 The court also held that the accountant
could be required to pay liquidated damages to her former employer
for accepting the business of any of her employer's clients.6
The holding in Perry provided too little protection to employees and
the public. Reasonable postemployment restrictive covenants should
be enforced. A postemployment restrictive covenant may reasonably
prevent the employee from soliciting or accepting the business of the
employer's clients. However, the covenant is reasonable only where
the employee has had significant personal contact with the client. Fur-
thermore, an employee should not be prevented from soliciting or
1. 109 Wash. 2d 691, 748 P.2d 224 (1987), modified, I11 Wash. 2d 885, 766 P.2d 1096, cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989).
2. Id. at 700-01, 748 P.2d at 229.
3. Id. at 692, 748 P.2d at 224-25.
4. Id. at 694, 748 P.2d at 225-226.
5. Id. at 700, 748 P.2d at 229.
6. Id. at 699-700, 748 P.2d at 228-29. The noncompetition agreement defined "clients" as
any client that the employer had served during the accountant's tenure at the firm. Id. at 693,
748 P.2d at 225.
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accepting business from clients who left the employer for reasons other
than to follow the employee.
I. BACKGROUND: POSTEMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS AND PERRY V MORAN.
A. Postemployment Restrictive Covenants
The postemployment noncompetition covenant in Perry v. Moran is
typical of many agreements that employees sign as a condition of
employment.7 The covenant stated that, upon termination of employ-
ment, the employee would not serve any of the employer's clients for
five years.' Postemployment convenants are commonly used by firms
employing professionals,9 such as doctors' ° and accountants."
A noncompetition covenant restrains trade because it limits the
rights of the employee to work in his or her profession.' 2 In Washing-
ton and other jurisdictions, covenants that unreasonably restrain trade
are unenforceable as against public policy.' 3 Therefore, jurisdictions
that have not completely invalidated postemployment restrictive cove-
nants enforce such covenants only to the extent that they reasonably
protect legitimate business interests of an employer.14
7. Postemployment restrictive covenants often restrict the employee from engaging in his
profession within a given geographic area. Courts will examine such restrictions for
reasonableness. See, e.g., Wood v. May, 73 Wash. 2d 307, 313-14, 438 P.2d 587, 591-92 (1968)
(remanded for reduction in geographic restriction). Geographic limitations were not at issue in
Perry and are beyond the scope of this note.
8. Perry, 109 Wash. 2d at 693, 748 P.2d at 225.
9. Postemployment restrictive covenants are also used outside of the professions. See, e.g.,
Wood, 73 Wash. 2d at 308, 438 P.2d at 588 (restrictive covenant used by a horseshoer for his
apprentice).
10. See, e.g., Bauer v. Sawyer, 8 Ill. 2d 351, 134 N.E.2d 329, 331 (1956) (restricting doctor
from practicing within city for five years was reasonable).
11. See, e.g., Racine v. Bender, 141 Wash. 606, 252 P. 115 (1927).
Restrictive covenants are not enforced against attorneys. See WASH. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6(a) (1988); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
5.6(a) (1988); see, e.g., Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 336 A.2d 498, 500 (1975), aff'd per
curiam, 137 N.J. Super. 135, 348 A.2d 208 (1975). A covenant restricting a lawyer is void
because the attorney-client relationship is highly fiduciary. The client must be able to place
confidence in the attorney of his or her choice. Dwyer, 336 A.2d at 500.
12. E.g., Racine, 141 Wash. at 611, 252 P. at 116-17; see also, 14 S. WILLISTON, A
TREASTISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1633 (3d ed. 1972).
13. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.030; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186
(1979).
14. See, e.g., Wood v. May, 73 Wash. 2d 307, 312, 438 P.2d 587, 590 (1968); Eastern Distrib.
Co. v. Flynn, 222 Kan. 666, 567 P.2d 1371, 1376 (1977); see also 14 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1636 (3d ed. 1972).
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1. The Competing Interests
Several competing interests underlie postemployment restrictive
covenants. Employers, employees, and the public all arguably have
interests that they are trying to protect. The weight that a court gives
any of the interests may determine whether a covenant is enforced.15
The employer uses a restrictive covenant to protect his or her busi-
ness by preventing the employee from taking the employer's clients.
The employer argues that the client's desire to use the employee's serv-
ices is part of the business "goodwill." 6 Goodwill can include a repu-
tation for integrity, skill, and politeness, as well as the confidence that
induces clients to return to the same business." The Perry court held
that goodwill belonged to the accounting firm." Without protection,
an employee could take advantage of information about the client's
business or the employee's personal contact with the client, thereby
infringing on the employer's goodwill.19 A restrictive covenant that
prevents the employee from using the business's goodwill also enables
the employer to secure the full benefit of the employee's services. In
Perry, the court noted that without the protection of a restrictive cove-
nant, the employer would have to prevent the formation of personal
relationships between the employee and the client.2 0 The employer
might prevent the formation of personal relationships by constantly
rotating the employee's assignments.21
Some courts have held that goodwill does not belong to the busi-
ness. These courts reason that the goodwill a client feels towards the
business belongs to the employees. 2 Therefore, the employer has no
legitimate interest to protect and the restrictive covenant cannot be
upheld.23
15. Compare Racine, 141 Wash. at 612-13, 252 P. at 117 (a restrictive covenant that prevents
a client from selecting a particular professional only slightly harms the public; the law presumes
that another competent professional is available) with Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v.
Edelson, 183 N.J. Super. 434, 444 A.2d 75, 79-80 (1982) (the public is not a party in the
employment agreement and, therefore, must not be prevented from choosing a professional).
16. See Racine, 141 Wash. at 610-11, 252 P. at 116; see also Martin v. Jablonski, 253 Mass.
451, 149 N.E. 156, 159 (1925) (goodwill is all that goes with a business in excess of capital and
physical value).
17. See Martin, 149 N.E. at 159.
18. Perry v. Moran, 109 Wash. 2d 691, 697-98, 700, 748 P.2d 224, 227-229 (1987), modified,
I1I Wash. 2d 885, 766 P.2d 1096, cerL denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 700-01, 748 P.2d at 229.
21. Id. at 700, 748 P.2d at 229.
22. See, eg., Cook v. Lauten, 1 Ill. App. 2d 255, 117 N.E.2d 414, 416 (1954).
23. Id.
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An Ohio court carefully articulated the employee's interests in post-
employment restrictive covenants in Arthur Murray Dance Studios of
Cleveland v. Witter.24 The Arthur Murray court stated four major
employee interests: the employee's interest in working in a chosen
trade, the employee's interest in supporting self and family, the
employee's interest in using personal skills and talents, and the
employee's interest in bettering his or her status. In addition,
restricting an employee from serving a client not only deprives the
employee of that client's business, but can also harm the employee's
job opportunities. a6
The public's primary interest in postemployment restrictive cove-
nants is receiving services from a chosen professional. a7 Some courts
have stated that the relationship between a client and a professional is
highly personal and the client must be able to select the professional of
his or her choice.2 8 However, many other courts have made the pre-
sumption that other competent professionals are available.2 9 There-
fore, the public is not unduly harmed by restrictions that preclude
using a particular professional.3 ° These courts also reason that the
client's attraction to a particular professional is less compelling when
based on a previous relationship made possible only by the former
employer.3 1
In addition to the public's interest in the freedom to select particular
professionals, the public may have more general interests. The public
may be harmed if a restrictive covenant deprives an employee of her
livelihood and the public must support her.32 The public also has an
24. 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685 (1952).
25. Id. 105 N.E.2d at 692; see supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing restraint of
trade).
26. Respondant's Motion for Reconsideration at 9-10, Perry v. Moran, 109 Wash. 2d 691,
748 P.2d 224 (1987) (No. 52944-2) (a firm may not want to hire an employee who is restricted
from serving many clients), modified, Ill Wash. 2d 885, 766 P.2d 1096, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3228 (1989).
27. Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d
685, 692 (1952); 14 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1635 (3d ed.
1972).
28. See Alexander & Alexander v. Wohlman, 19 Wash. App. 670, 687, 578 P.2d 530, 540,
review denied, 91 Wash. 2d 1006 (1978); Smith, Batchelder and Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679,
406 A.2d 1310, 1313 (1979).
29. E.g., Racine v. Bender, 141 Wash. 606, 613, 252 P. 115, 117 (1927).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Perry v. Moran, 109 Wash. 2d 691, 697-98, 748 P.2d 224, 227-28 (1987),
modified, 111 Wash. 2d 885, 766 P.2d 1096, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989); Racine, 141
Wash. at 612-13, 252 P. at 117.
32. Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d
685, 691 (1952) (modern changes in transportation and technology allow the employee more
flexibility, so the threat of going on public assistance is not as great).
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interest in encouraging competition, which tends to be reduced by
postemployment restrictive covenants.33
2. Judicial Responses to Postemployment Restrictive Covenants: The
Rule of Reason, the Blue Pencil Test, and Invalidation
Many jurisdictions, including Washington, use the Rule of Reason
to determine whether a postemployment restrictive covenant will be
enforced.34 Under the Rule of Reason, the courts determine reasona-
bleness by applying a three-part test to the facts of each case.35 The
test balances the interests of the employer, the employee, and the pub-
lic. 36 The restrictive covenant (1) must be necessary for the protection
of the business or goodwill of the employer, (2) must not impose a
greater restraint on the employee than is reasonably necessary to
secure the employer's business or goodwill, and (3) must not cause
undue injury to the public through loss of that employee's services.37
The courts may rewrite unreasonable clauses so that they are
reasonable.38
The Rule of Reason may produce drastically different results from
those produced by the "blue pencil" method. Some jurisdictions apply
the blue pencil test when the restrictive covenant is determined to
result in restraint of trade.39 Instead of rewriting an unreasonable
clause, the court simply "crosses out" the offending clause of the
restrictive covenant.' The court will enforce the remainder of the
contract only if it still makes sense.4" Therefore, a contract that may
have been rewritten and enforced under the Rule of Reason may be
unenforceable under the blue pencil method.42
33. Id.; see also 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1447 (3d ed.
1972).
34. See, e.g., Perry, 109 Wash. 2d at 698, 748 P.2d at 228; 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1447 (3d ed. 1972).
35. See 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1447 (3d ed. 1972).
36. Perry, 109 Wash. 2d at 698, 748 P.2d at 228; 14 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1636 (3d ed. 1972).
37. Perry, 109 Wash. 2d at 698, 748 P.2d at 228; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 188 (1979).
38. Perry, 109 Wash. 2d at 703, 748 P.2d at 230; Wood v. May, 73 Wash. 2d 307, 312, 438
P.2d 587, 590 (1968).
39. See, eg., Briggs v. Butler, 140 Ohio St. 499, 45 N.E.2d 757, 761 (1942).
40. See id.
41. Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544, 546 (1975). The "blue
pencil" test was developed as an attempt to soften the original rule that all postemployment
restrictions were void. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 183 (1979).
42. Raimonde, 325 N.E.2d at 546.
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Rather than use the Rule of Reason or the blue pencil test, some
jurisdictions simply invalidate noncompetition covenants.43 However,
exceptions to the rule of invalidation give courts great discretion to
decide whether or not the restrictive covenant is invalid.' Therefore,
the invalidation method can lead to inconsistent results. Critics also
argue that invalidation erroneously ignores the legitimate interests of
the employer.4 5
B. Postemployment Restrictive Covenants in Washington and in
Other Jurisdictions
In Perry v. Moran,46 the Washington Supreme Court required an
employee to pay liquidated damages to her former employer for violat-
ing a postemployment restrictive covenant. Jurisdictions are split on
whether a restrictive covenant may prevent the employee from serving
any of the employer's clients or merely from soliciting the business of
the employer's clients. However, most jurisdictions have determined
that personal contact between the employee and the client gives the
employee an "unfair" competitive advantage and that the employer
deserves protection.
1. Facts and Holding of Perry v. Moran
In Perry v. Moran,47 an accountant signed an employment agree-
ment with an accounting firm.48 The agreement contained a postem-
ployment restrictive covenant stating that upon termination of
employment, the accountant would not serve any of the employer's
clients for five years.49 The covenant defined "clients" as including all
clients or accounts served by the accounting firm while the accountant
was employed there.5" According to the agreement, if the accountant
43. Among these states are California, Louisiana, Michigan, North Dakota, and Oklahoma.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600, 16601, 16602 (West 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-921
(West 1985); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.61 (Callaghan 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1971),
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 217 (West 1981).
44. See, e.g., Chalmers Corp. v. Carnell, 479 So. 2d 990 (La. Ct. App. 1985). Louisiana law
invalidates restrictive covenants unless the employer has incurred advertising or employee
training expenses. In Chalmers, the employer spent over $500 on training seminars and
textbooks. However, this court held that the employer did not meet the exceptions requirements.
Id. at 992-93.
45. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing invalidation problems).
46. 109 Wash. 2d 691, 748 P.2d 224 (1987), modified, 111 Wash. 2d 885, 766 P.2d 1096, cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 692, 748 P.2d at 225.
49. Id. at 693, 748 P.2d at 225.
50. Id.
214
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served any of the employer's clients, she would pay liquidated dam-
ages to the employer. 1
The accountant worked as head of the employer's retirement
department for slightly more than one year.52 Shortly after resigning
her position, the accountant formed a combined practice with two
other accountants, both of whom had been members of her depart-
ment at the employer's firm." Although the accountant did not solicit
her former employer's clients, she did accept work from several of her
employer's current and former clients. 4 The employer sued for
injunctive relief and alternatively, for liquidated damages.5
The trial court refused to enforce the covenant 6.5  The trial court
found that the accountant had not diverted any of her employer's
active clients and therefore had not harmed her employer. 7 The court
reasoned that restricting the accountant from serving clients who had
already left the accounting firm was not reasonably necessary to pro-
tect the accounting firm." On appeal, the Washington Court of
Appeals certified the case directly to the Washington Supreme Court,
which reversed. 9
The Washington Supreme Court applied the three-part Rule of Rea-
son test and determined that the covenant was reasonable.6 The
court found that the accounting firm's business interests were legiti-
mate,"6 1 the covenant did not unduly restrain the employee,62 and the
public was not unduly harmed.63
The court made no attempt to rewrite the covenant. The court held
that it was reasonable for the employer to prohibit the accountant
from merely accepting, as well as soliciting the employer's clients.'
The court did not address the issue of whether the employer's protect-
able interest should be limited to clients with whom the employee
actually had significant personal contact. The court also did not
51. Id.; see infra note 92 (discussing the Perry court's liquidated damages holding).
52. Perry, 109 Wash. 2d at 692-93, 748 P.2d at 225.
53. Id. at 694, 748 P.2d at 225-26.
54. Id at 694-95, 748 P.2d at 226.
55. Id. at 694, 748 P.2d at 226.
56. Id. at 694-95, 748 P.2d at 226.
57. Id. at 695, 748 P.2d at 226.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 697, 748 P.2d at 227; see WASH. R. App. P. 4.3.
60. Perry, 109 Wash. 2d at 698-700, 748 P.2d at 228-29; see supra note 37 and accompanying
text (discussing the Rule of Reason test).
61. Perry, 109 Wash. 2d at 700, 748 P.2d at 229.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 702, 748 P.2d at 230.
64. Id. at 701, 748 P.2d at 229.
Washington Law Review
address whether the restrictive covenant should exclude clients who
had left the employer for reasons other than to follow the employee.
Finally, even upon reconsideration, the court held that liquidated
damages could be awarded for any of the employer's clients that the
accountant served after she left the employer.65
2. Is Solicitation Necessary?
The Perry court held that a postemployment agreement preventing
an employee from accepting business from her employer's clients may
be reasonable even if the employee did not solicit the client's busi-
ness.66 The court stated that requiring proof of solicitation would
place an undue burden on the employer.67  The employer's burden
would be difficult and expensive, and would offend the employer's
clients.68
Other jurisdictions are split on the issue of solicitation. Many juris-
dictions agree with Washington and hold that solicitation is unneces-
sary.69  These jurisdictions reason that an employee's unfair
competitive advantage arises out of his or her personal contact with
the employer's clients.7" The advantage can harm the employer
whether the employee solicits or merely accepts the client's business.7 '
On the other hand, some jurisdictions hold that solicitation is neces-
sary.72 These courts reason that enforcing covenants not to serve cli-
ents creates a disproportionate hardship on the employee.73 Enforcing
the covenant only when the employee has solicited a client's business
mitigates the hardship to the employee.74 In addition, some courts
reason that requiring solicitation mitigates harm to the public.75
65. Perry v. Moran, 111 Wash. 2d 885, 887, 766 P.2d 1096, 1097 (1989), modifying 109
Wash. 2d 691, 748 P.2d 224 (1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989).
66. Perry v. Moran, 109 Wash. 2d 691, 701, 748 P.2d 224, 229, modified, Ill Wash. 2d 885,
766 P.2d 1096 (1989), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989). But see Alexander & Alexander v.
Wohlman, 19 Wash. App. 670, 688, 578 P.2d 530, 540 (the restrictive covenant, as applied to an
insurance salesman, was valid only when the employees had solicited the employer's clients),
review denied, 91 Wash. 2d 1006 (1978). Perry has effectively overruled Alexander.
67. Perry, 109 Wash. 2d at 701, 748 P.2d at 229.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463, 467 (Del. Ch. 1977).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679, 406 A.2d 1310, 1313 (1979);
Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 183 N.J. Super. 434, 444 A.2d 75, 79 (1982).
73. Smith, Batchelder & Rugg, 406 A.2d at 1313.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Mailman, 444 A.2d at 79.
216
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3. Is Personal Contact Necessary?
In Perry, the Washington Supreme Court enforced the noncompeti-
tion covenant even though the employee had significant personal con-
tact with only some of the clients.76 The Perry court stated that
personal contact gave the employee an unfair advantage, but upheld a
restrictive covenant that was not limited to clients with whom the
employee had contact.77 Thus, the Perry court implied that it was
irrelevant that the accountant did not in all cases have significant per-
sonal contact.78 The Perry decision breaks with previous Washington
cases implying that significant personal contact with an individual cli-
ent is necessary before a postemployment restrictive covenant will be
enforced.79
Other jurisdictions generally require that some degree of significant
personal contact exist before a covenant will be enforced. In Arthur
Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, 10 an Ohio court deter-
mined that a restrictive covenant was unreasofnable because a dance
instructor's personal contact with the employer's clients was too brief
to provide the dance instructor with any ability to attract the clients. 81
The court stated that reasonableness is determined from the contract
and from the situation in which it is sought to be enforced.82 Once
significant personal contact has been shown to have existed with some
clients, many courts do not differentiate between these clients and cli-
ents with whom no significant personal contact existed. 3 However,
some courts have rewritten the covenant to include only the clients
with whom the employee had significant personal contact.8"
76. Perry v. Moran, 109 Wash. 2d 691, 697, 700, 748 P.2d 224, 227, 229 (1987), modified, 111
Wash. 2d 885, 766 P.2d 1096, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989).
77. Id. at 697-98, 700, 748 P.2d at 227, 229.
78. Id. at 700, 748 P.2d at 229.
79. See infra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing earlier Washington cases and
personal contact).
80. 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685 (1952).
81. Id. 105 N.E.2d at 705, 712 (comparing the lack of significant contact to an elevator
operator's ability to change buildings and lure away tenants). To determine if significant
personal contact existed, giving the employee an unfair competitive advantage, the court asked
many questions. For example: Did the employee's position give him or her an opportunity to
become acquainted with the employer's clients? How many clients did the employee know? Was
the employee's contact regular? Would the client be inclined to follow the employee? Id. 105
N.E.2d at 696-99.
82. Id. 105 N.E:2d at 692-94.
83. See, eg., Wolf and Co. v. Waldron, 51 Ill. App. 3d 239, 366 N.E.2d 603, 606 (1977).
84. See, eg., Eastern Distrib. Co. v. Flynn, 222 Kan. 666, 567 P.2d 1371, 1377, 1379 (1977).
217
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4. May the Employee Serve the Employer's Former Clients?
In Perry, the Washington Supreme Court did not distinguish
between active and former clients. Some of the clients from whom the
accountant accepted business had already terminated their relation-
ships with the employer before the accountant left the employer.85
The court, without explanation, simply stated that it was reasonable
for the restrictive covenant to preclude the accountant from accepting
business from any client who had used the employer while the
accountant was working there.86
Only a few jurisdictions distinguish between former and active cli-
ents. A New Jersey court held that although a covenant may prevent
an employee from soliciting former and present clients, a covenant
cannot prevent the employee from merely accepting business from for-
mer clients.87 The court reasoned that the public has the right to
terminate the employer's services and then to freely choose an
accountant.88
5. Liquidated Damages
In Perry, the Washington Supreme Court held that a covenant
requiring the accountant to compensate the employer in liquidated
damages for serving any of the employer's clients was reasonable.89
The clause stated that the accountant would pay the employer liqui-
dated damages if, within five years after leaving the employer, the
accountant served any client who had been the employer's client dur-
ing the employee's tenure.9" The liquidated damages were set at fifty
percent of the amount the accountant billed the employer's clients for
the first three years of service.9 The court stated that the liquidated
damages clause was reasonable for two reasons: the harm caused by
the breach was difficult to ascertain and the amount of damages pro-
vided was a reasonable forecast of compensation for the actual harm.92
85. Perry v. Moran, 109 Wash. 2d 691, 695, 748 P.2d 224, 226 (1987), modified, 11I Wash.
2d 885, 766 P.2d 1096, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989).
86. Id. at 700, 748 P.2d at 229.
87. Mailman, Ross, Toyes & Shapiro v. Edelson, 183 N.J. Super. 434, 444 A.2d 75, 79 (1982);
see also Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679, 406 A.2d 1310, 1312 (1979)
(restricting employee from all clients that the employer had ever served was too broad).
88. Mailman, 444 A.2d at 80.
89. Perry, 109 Wash. 2d at 699, 748 P.2d at 228.
90. Id. at 693, 748 P.2d at 225.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 699, 748 P.2d at 228. The court originally held that the damages were reasonable
and awarded them without remanding. The amount was derived from a formula that was linked
218
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II. ANALYSIS: PROTECTING EMPLOYERS FROM A
FORMER EMPLOYEE'S UNFAIR COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE
A. The Rule of Reason Is the Most Appropriate Response to
Postemployment Restrictive Covenants
In Perry v. Moran," the court correctly determined that in Wash-
ington courts should apply the Rule of Reason to postemployment
restrictive covenants and uphold such covenants to the extent that
they are reasonable. The Rule of Reason is preferable to either invali-
dation94 or the blue pencil method9" because the Rule of Reason is
more likely to protect a business's legitimate interests.
Strict invalidation is inappropriate because the employer's legiti-
mate interests deserve protection. Courts that apply invalidation
emphasize the right of the employee to engage in his or her chosen
occupation and the general policy against restraint of trade.96 Juris-
dictions that apply invalidation have determined that postemployment
agreements are simply an attempt to eliminate competition and, there-
fore, will not enforce the covenants.97 These jurisdictions erroneously
ignore the employer's legitimate interests and incorrectly reason that
the advantage or goodwill acquired by the employee belongs to the
employee, not to the business." They ignore that many of the clients
originally approached the business because of the employer's reputa-
tion. An employer, such as an accounting firm, invests effort and
money into building a client base. The employer builds a client base
through word of mouth regarding the employer's fine reputation,
through advertising, and through years of quality service. These
to the actual harm. Also, the percent and number of years used in the clause were similar to
other employment agreements that the court had previously held were reasonable. Id.
On reconsideration, the court remanded to determine if the accountant had served the
employer's clients and if the amount of liquidated damages was reasonable. Perry v. Moran, 111
Wash. 2d 885, 887, 766 P.2d 1096, 1097 (1989), modifying 109 Wash. 2d 691, 748 P.2d 224
(1987), cerL denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989).
93. 109 Wash. 2d 691, 748 P.2d 224 (1987), modified, 111 Wash. 2d 885, 766 P.2d 1096, cerL
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989).
94. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (discussing the invalidation method).
95. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (discussing the blue pencil method).
96. See, eg., Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239, 42 Cal. Rptr. 107, 398
P.2d 147, 149 (1965).
97. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing invalidation jurisdictions).
98. See, eg., Cook v. Lauten, 1 Ill. App. 2d 255, 117 N.E.2d 414, 416 (1954).
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courts also ignore that the employer provided the means for the rela-
tionship between the employee and the client and that the employee
was being paid for his or her contribution to the relationship. 99
Jurisdictions that apply invalidation overemphasize the alleged
anticompetitive purpose of restrictive covenants. As the court previ-
ously recognized in Racine v. Bender, a postemployment agreement
that prevents an employee from using the employer's reputation to
contact clients and take the clients' business does not necessarily
demonstrate an intent to eliminate competition."° A restrictive cove-
nant has the effect of eliminating some competition and therefore
restraining trade, but any business contract will restrain trade in some
way. 101
Finally, the trend towards awarding liquidated damages makes
invalidation unnecessary.' °2 Liquidated damages mitigate harm suf-
fered by the employee, the employer, and the public. 0 3 When courts
award liquidated damages the employee may choose to retain the cli-
ent during the period of time stated in the restrictive covenant. Liqui-
dated damages allow the public to also retain its freedom of choice. In
addition, the employer's legitimate interests are protected because the
employee compensates the employer for his investment in the client.
The Rule of Reason is not only preferable to invalidation, but it is
also preferable to the blue pencil method. The Rule of Reason, used
by the Perry court, provides greater flexibility than the blue pencil
method. °4 Under the Rule of Reason, the court simply rewrites
unreasonable terms. 0 5 By contrast, the blue pencil method can leave
legitimate business interests unprotected. 0 6 The court may strike a
restrictive covenant that protects a legitimate business interest merely
because the covenant also protects another unreasonable interest.'0 7
In addition, concern over blue pencil invalidation may discourage
employers from including in the agreement protections to which they
99. See Racine v. Bender, 141 Wash. 606, 610-11, 252 P. 115, 116 (1927).
100. See id. at 611-12, 252 P. at 117.
101. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (discussing reasonable restraint of trade).
102. See generally Perry v. Moran, 109 Wash. 2d 691, 702, 748 P.2d 224, 230 (1987),
modified, 111 Wash. 2d 885, 766 P.2d 1096, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989).
103. Id.
104. See Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544, 546-47 (1975).
105. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing rewriting under the Rule of
Reason).
106. Raimonde, 325 N.E.2d at 546.
107. Id.
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are entitled. 108 These problems have led many jurisdictions to aban-
don the blue pencil test. 109
One advantage of the blue pencil test is that the possibility of blue
pencil invalidation may prevent overzealous employers from including
unreasonable protection. However, the Rule of Reason does not leave
the employee completely unprotected. The Rule of Reason still allows
the employee to convince a court that the restrictive covenant should
be rewritten.
B. Restrictions Not to Serve the Employer's Clients Should Prevent
the Employee from Using an Actual Competitive Advantage
Although the Rule of Reason is the proper method for evaluating
postemployment restrictive covenants, the Washington Supreme
Court's application of the rule in Perry v. Moran 0 was only partially
correct. The court correctly determined that an employee may breach
a noncompetition covenant even when he or she has not solicited the
employer's clients.III The court incorrectly decided, however, that the
restrictive covenant reasonably included clients with whom the
employee had no significant personal contact." 2 Finally, the court
erred by enforcing the covenant even when the client had clearly left
the employer's services for reasons other than to follow the
employee. 113
1. The Washington Supreme Court Is Correct Not to Require
Solicitation
The Perry court correctly held that the employee's solicitation of the
employer's clients is unnecessary for two reasons. First, solicitation is
irrelevant to protecting the employer's interests." 4 Second, proving
that solicitation occurred is difficult and is potentially harmful to the
employer, the employee, and the public.' ' 5
108. Id.
109. Id. at 546-47; see also Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 28 N.Y.2d 45, 320 N.Y.S.2d 1, 268 N.E.2d
751, 754-55 (1971); 14 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1647C (3d
ed. 1972).
110. Perry v. Moran, 109 Wash. 2d 691, 748 P.2d 224 (1987), modified, 111 Wash. 2d 885,
766 P.2d 1096, cerL denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989).
111. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text (discussing solicitation in various
jurisdictions).
112. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (discussing significant personal contact).
113. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (discussing former clients in various
jurisdictions).
114. Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463, 467 (Del. Ch. 1977).
115. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing proof of solicitation).
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Solicitation is irrelevant because the covenant's purpose is to pre-
vent the employee from taking advantage of his or her relationship
with the employer's clients." 16 As the court recognized in Racine v.
Bender, an employee's unfair competitive advantage arises out of his
or her personal contact with the employer's clients." 7 Whether the
personal relationship allows the employee a special opportunity to
solicit the client, or gives the client an incentive to seek out the
employee, is irrelevant."' The advantage can harm the employer
whether the employee solicits or merely accepts the client's business.
Furthermore, requiring solicitation creates problems of proof.
First, proving solicitation can be difficult and expensive.' 9 Proving
solicitation is especially difficult when the client has expressed a pref-
erence for the employee and would be reluctant to harm the employee
by testifying. Further, drawing a line between whether the employee
solicited the client or the client approached the employee is imprecise
and would require expensive litigation.
In addition, proving solicitation would harm the employer, the
employee, and the public, regardless of who ultimately prevails in the
suit.'2 ° Because the only realistic way to determine whether the
employee solicited the client is to force the client to testify,' 2' the
employer and the employee may gain a reputation in the community
for dragging clients into unpleasant litigation. Although the employer
has already lost the client, litigation could also cause the employee to
lose the client. The client's testimony is likely to further harm the
employer's reputation because the testimony will include the client's
reasons for preferring the employee's services. Members of the public
are harmed by the increased likelihood of being called into court to
testify. Proving solicitation also harms the public by increasing trial
length and further crowding court calendars.
The purported benefits of requiring solicitation are marginal at best.
Allowing an employee to accept the business of a client, but not to
solicit that business, does not significantly increase the public's free-
dom to choose a professional. 2 2 The public does not have complete
freedom of choice unless the client is informed of his or her choices.
116. Faw, Casson & Co., 375 A.2d at 467.
117. Racine v. Bender, 141 Wash. 606, 612-13, 252 P. 115, 117 (1927).
118. Id.
119. Perry v. Moran, 109 Wash. 2d 691, 700, 748 P.2d 224, 229 (1987), modified, 111 Wash.
2d 885, 766 P.2d 1096, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989).
120. Id.
121. Id,
122. See supra notes 66, 75 and accompanying text (discussing public's freedom of choice).
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Preventing a professional from informing any member of the public of
that professional's services infringes on the client's freedom to make
an informed choice. Thus, the incremental benefit to the public of
requiring solicitation is so small that it does not outweigh the
problems caused by requiring solicitation.
2. The Washington Supreme Court Should Require Significant
Personal Contact with Each Client
The Perry court erroneously ignored the necessity of significant per-
sonal contact between the employee and each client. The court cor-
rectly recognized that personal contact is the source of an employee's
advantage. However, the court failed to ask whether the employee
actually had significant personal contact with each of the employer's
clients that she served after leaving the employer.123 The court held
that it was reasonable to restrict the accountant from serving all of the
employer's clients. 24
The Perry court ignored the importance that Washington courts
have given personal contact. The court cited two earlier Washington
cases, Racine v. Bender,'2 and Knight, Vale and Gregory v. McDan-
iel, '26 for the proposition that personal contact gave the accountant an
unfair competitive advantage to take the client from the employer. 127
However, the Perry court failed to recognize that Racine and Knight
enforced restrictive covenants only when personal contact with each
client actually existed. 2
The Perry court awarded the employer more protection than it
deserved. The court reasoned that the accountant had sufficient per-
sonal contact with her employer's clients because the accountant was
the head of a department in her employer's firm. 2 9 The court erred
when it did not allow the accountant to demonstrate that she did not
have significant personal contact with all of her employer's clients.
Although the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant is to be deter-
mined from the facts of each case,13 0 the Perry court failed to look at
123. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing significant personal contact).
124. Perry, 109 Wash. 2d at 700, 748 P.2d at 229.
125. 141 Wash. 606, 252 P. 115 (1927).
126. 37 Wash. App. 366, 680 P.2d 448, review denied, 101 Wash. 2d 1025 (1984).
127. Perry, 109 Wash. 2d at 695, 748 P.2d at 227.
128. Racine, 141 Wash. at 607, 252 P. at 115; Knight, 37 Wash. App. at 369-370 n.1, 680
P.2d at 451-452 n.1 (noting that the court would have had reservations if the employer had
sought enforcement regarding clients with whom the employee did not have significant personal
contact).
129. Perry, 109 Wash. 2d at 692, 696, 748 P.2d at 225, 227.
130. Wood v. May, 73 Wash. 2d 307, 312, 438 P.2d 587, 590 (1968).
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the facts of this case. As the dissent in Perry stated, an employee's
unfair competitive advantage arises only where there has been per-
sonal contact between the employee and the employer's clients.1 3'
Enforcing a covenant that covers all clients provides the employer
more protection than necessary.132 A court should adjust a covenant
that disregards personal contact so that the restriction includes only
clients with whom the employee had personal contact. 33
Unlike solicitation, proving personal contact does not create serious
problems. Putting the burden of proof on the employee protects the
employer's interests, while allowing the employee to demonstrate that
he or she did not have an unfair competitive advantage. The employee
can prove that he or she did not have significant personal contact with
an individual client without requiring the client's testimony and alien-
ating the client. 31 Instead, the employee can use the employer's busi-
ness records to establish whether sufficient contact existed. 35
3. The Washington Supreme Court Is Wrong to Restrict the
Employee From Serving All Former Clients of the
Employer
The Perry court erred by enforcing a covenant when the client left
the employer before the employee, or the client used another profes-
sional's services before using the employee's services. The employer
does not have a legitimate interest in prohibiting an employee from
taking clients that the employer has already lost. Restricting an
employee from serving all of the employer's former clients 36 violates
the Washington policy of protecting the employer's legitimate interests
only.'37 The court should have rewritten the covenant to exclude for-
mer clients who had left the employer before the employee or who had
used another professional's services before using the employee's.
The employer in Perry provided two arguments for not distinguish-
ing between former and active clients. First, the employer argued that
131. Perry, 109 Wash. 2d at 707, 748 P.2d at 232 (Utter, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 706, 748 P.2d at 232-233.
133. Wood, 73 Wash. 2d. at 312, 438 P.2d at 590 (it could be proper for the trial court to limit
a restrictive covenant to include only those clients with whom the employee had personal
contact).
134. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text (discussing client testimony).
135. Perry v. Moran, Ill Wash. 2d 885, 891-92, 766 P.2d 1096, 1099 (1989) (Utter, J.,
dissenting), modifying 109 Wash. 2d 691, 748 P.2d 224 (1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228
(1989).
136. See supra note 6 (defining "clients").
137. Perry, 109 Wash. 2d at 707, 748 P.2d at 232 (Utter, J., dissenting).
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a client does not always notify the employer when the client termi-
nates his services. 138 The lack of notification, the employer argued, is
particularly troublesome in professions in which the client only occas-
sionally requires services. 13 9 Second, the employer argued that the
accountant set up a "screen." 1" A screen is another professional who
works as an accomplice to the employee.14 ' The accounting firm
argued that the accountant had induced an accomplice to serve the
client for a short time.142 The client then began to use the employee's
services without appearing to have left the employer to follow the
employee. 143
The employer's arguments are not persuasive. First, concerns over
difficulty of proof can be alleviated by shifting the burden of proof to
the employee. 1  The employee would have to demonstrate that the
client had terminated his relationship with the firm before the
employee left the firm, or that the client had used another profes-
sional's services before using the employee. The employee could prove
both through a client's testimony or through business records. The
employee would decide if using the client's testimony was worth the
possibility of alienating the client. The employee could also use the
employer's business records or a third professional's business records
to prove that the client did not leave the employer to follow the
employee. Second, the possibility of employee fraud through the use
of a screen does not justify enforcing a covenant where the employer
has no legitimate interest. Although it might be possible for the
employee to prove that he or she did not set up a screen, the law
should not assume dishonesty on the part of the employee. Further-
more, if an employee has set up a screen, the employer would have the
opportunity to prove it. The reasonableness of a restrictive covenant
in Washington is to be determined from the facts of each case. 145 An
employee should be allowed to present facts that prove that the client
had already left and was therefore not within the legitimate interests of
the employer. 146
138. Appellant's Brief at 23-24, Perry v. Moran, 109 Wash. 2d 691, 748 P.2d 224 (1987)
(15168-1), modified, 111 Wash. 2d 885, 766 P.2d 1096, cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989).
139. Ia
140. Id. at 25-26.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Perry v. Moran, 109 Wash. 2d 691, 709, 748 P.2d 224, 233 (1987) (Utter, J., dissenting),
modified, 111 Wash. 2d 885, 766 P.2d 1096, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989).
145. Wood v. May, 73 Wash. 2d. 307, 312, 438 P.2d 587, 590 (1968).
146. Requiring the employee to demonstrate that the client left the employer's services before
the employee or that the client used another professional's services before using the employee's
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4. The Washington Supreme Court Should Award Liquidated
Damages Only for Clients with Whom the Employee Had
a Competitive Advantage
The Perry court correctly determined that the accountant should
pay the employer liquidated damages, rather than enjoining the
accountant from serving the employer's clients.' 47 Liquidated dam-
ages mitigate the restrictive covenant's harm to the employee and the
public. However, the court erroneously awarded liquidated damages
to the employer for clients with whom the accountant did not have a
competitive advantage.
The Perry court correctly determined that liquidated damages are
preferable to injunctive relief in noncompetition cases. Enjoining an
employee from serving the employer's clients harms the public, the
employer, and the employee. The public is harmed because the
employer's clients are barred from using a particular professional.
Although the law presumes that another competent professional is
available,' 48 the relationship between a professional and a client can be
highly personal.' 49 Liquidated damages allow the public freedom to
choose a particular professional. By infringing on the public's free-
dom to choose, injunctive relief can harm the employer. A client who
has been enjoined from using a preferred employee probably will not
return to the employer. In contrast, liquidated damages compensate
the employer for loss of the client's business. Finally, injunctive relief
harms the employee because the employee may not work for a client
who prefers the employee. Liquidated damages allow the employee to
continue his or her successful relationship with the client.
Liquidated damages are especially appropriate for violations of
postemployment restrictive covenants because expert testimony can
establish an amount that reasonably compensates the employer for the
loss of clients. Clients are frequently bought and sold. Expert testi-
mony can establish the amount that is generally used in a particular
provides objective evidence that the employee was not using an unfair competitive advantage to
lure the client. The employee may argue that the client was dissatisfied with the employer's
services and that the employee did not use an unfair advantage. However, without more
objective proof, the result is a contest of which side can bring in the most clients to testify about
the employer's reputation.
147. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (discussing reasonable liquidated
damages).
148. Wood, 73 Wash. 2d at 310, 438 P.2d at 589.
149. See supra notes 11, 66 and accompanying text (discussing public's freedom of choice).
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profession for the purchase of an ongoing practice. 150 Using the mar-
ket price for clients is particularly fair because the businessperson
negotiating the purchase of clients does not experience the same pres-
sure that employees sometimes feel when entering an employment
contract.
Although the Perry court was correct to award liquidated damages,
the court was wrong to award damages greater than the harm caused
by the accountant's breach. 51  Liquidated damages should be pro-
vided only where the employee had an unfair competitive advantage.
In Perry, the accountant had no unfair competitive advantage with
many of her employer's clients.1 52 Liquidated damages should not
have been awarded for clients with whom she had no significant per-
sonal contact. The court also erred when it awarded liquidated dam-
ages for clients who had terminated the employer's services before the
accountant left the employer or clients who had used the services of
another professional before using the employee's services.1 53
III. CONCLUSION
In Perry v. Moran, 154 the court enforced an unreasonable restrictive
covenant. The Perry court correctly selected the Rule of Reason to
determine whether a restrictive covenant that prevented the employee
from serving the employer's clients was reasonable. Further, the court
correctly held that the employee could not solicit or accept business
from the employer's clients. The court, however, erred when it failed
to distinguish between clients with whom the employee had significant
personal contact and clients who had merely used the employer while
the employee was working for the employer. The court also erred by
failing to recognize the difference between former and active clients.
The Perry court correctly determined that liquidated damages are less
harmful to the employee than injunctive relief. However, the court
allowed liquidated damages to be awarded for clients with whom the
employee had no unfair competitive advantage.
The unfortunate result is that Washington law now extends too
much protection to the employer, at the expense of the employee and
150. Knight, Vale and Gregory v. McDaniel, 37 Wash. App. 366, 372, 680 P.2d 448, 453,
review denied, 101 Wash. 2d 1025 (1984).
151. See supra notes 123-46 and accompanying text (discussing covenant's overbreadth).
152. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (employee was the head of only one of the
firm's departments).
153. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text (discussing former clients).
154. 109 Wash. 2d 691, 748 P.2d 224 (1987), modified, 111 Wash. 2d 885, 766 P.2d 1096,
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3228 (1989).
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the public. Postemployment restrictive covenants should only allow
the employer to protect its legitimate business interests, while not
allowing an employer simply to remove a competitor. The court
should allow the employee to prove that he or she did not have an
unfair competitive advantage with a particular client. The employer
deserves liquidated damages only for clients with whom the employee
had an unfair competitive advantage.
Susan E. Corisis
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